Humans are geniuses at pretending. We can imagine that the world is different to how it actually is; a superpower that is at the core of our ability to imagine the future, engage in causal reasoning, and understand what it’s like to think like someone else. In psychology, the ability to create a mental model of a hypothetical situation is called having a secondary representation.
A primary representation is our brain’s ability to use sensory/perceptual information to generate a mental model of the world as it actually is. If you look at a can of coca cola, your brain uses the light bouncing off of the can to generate a visual image of that can. If you reach out to touch it, the tactile information gives you more information to add to your representation of the can. You can taste it, smell it, and even hear the can (if you tap it with your finger), generating even more sensory information that builds up a mental model in your mind of the can.
A secondary representation, on the other hand, does not need any sensory/perceptual information to generate a mental model of the can. If I pretend that I am holding a can of coca cola and say to you “this is a can of coke”, we can both engage in a conversation about the properties of this pretend can of coke, and even mime passing the “can” between us. Most people can even generate a fake mental image of that can, although people with aphantasia cannot (more info on that here). But you don’t need to visualize a can to engage in pretending. Mental representations are something other than visual representations (although nobody really understand what they are). We just know that the fake can is both fake and a can (i.e., a hypothetical situation that clashes with reality).
Scientists have always wondered if animals can pretend. Can they form secondary representations? It’s painfully difficult to design an experiment to show this. For humans, we can use language to explain that we’re pretending. But we don’t have this luxury with animals. It would be a big deal if they could pretend because, as I noted earlier, it would mean they have the cognitive building blocks to engage in those complex abilities needed to generate human intelligence (e.g., causal reasoning, theory of mind, mental time travel, etc.).
Which is why this new scientific article is such a big deal. It is, in my opinion, the best evidence that animals can generate secondary representations. It involved Kanzi the bonobo, a rather famous ape who could use a lexigram board to communicate. His board had words for hug, jello, water, chase, etc. nouns and verbs that research suggested Kanzi understands. Because Kanzi had spend so many years in the company of humans and been trained to use symbols to communicate, he was the ideal candidate to test to see if he could engage in pretending.
The experiment was simple and elegant. The researcher would present Kanzi an empty jug and two empty glasses and then pretend to pour “juice” from the jug into each glass. They would then pour the invisible “juice” from one of the glasses back into the jug, remove the jug from view, and ask Kanzi where the juice was. Kanzi would then point to the other glass that the researcher had not “poured” into the jug.
There were a bunch of controls to make sure that Kanzi was responding to the questions “where’s the juice” and not some other cue, like pointing at the the last thing the researcher had touched. I won’t go into the details (you can read them in the article), but they seemed well designed to suggest that Kanzi really was pointing at fake juice. You can see a video of the experiment below:
This is, in my opinion, remarkable. And it does suggest that Kanzi was pretending that there was juice - forming a secondary representation of juice being in the glass even though he knew that there wasn’t really juice in the glass. Awesome.
But, I wouldn’t be a real scientist if I just accepted this as definitive proof that non-human animals use and understand pretense or pretend at the same level of sophistication as a human. Here are some things to note about the experiment that furrow the brows of skeptical scientists:
Kanzi only correctly pointed to the pretend juice in 34 out of 50 trials. This is above chance, but nowhere near as good as his performance when asked to point to actual juice in a glass. What does his failure on those 16 other trails mean? You would expect a human to get it right 100% of the time, so failures must mean something about the difference between human and bonobo thinking?
Kanzi only observed the pretending, but didn’t engage in pretending himself. That is, he didn’t use a jug to pretend pour fake juice in a glass and then fake drink it. While there is some anecdotal evidence of great apes engaging in behavior that could be considered pretend play along these lines, there is not yet experimental evidence of animals doing this. The authors themselves noted this: “We haven’t shown that Kanzi was pretending himself. He is not pouring the liquid and creating these imaginary things, but we have shown that he understood pretense.”
This kind of nitpicking is the heart of good science. And it’s vital to pick those nits so we can figure out exactly what’s going on inside the minds of non-human animals as opposed to just assuming that they must be thinking identically to a human. Both the devil and the beauty is in those details.
Because Kanzi is an enculturated bonobo, meaning that he was raised by humans being taught how to do human things, the question remains as to how much his thinking had been warped by exposure to humans. Is his ability to understanding pretending because humans were able to generate a novel form of thinking in Kanzi that no other non-human ape would be capable of in a natural situation? Or maybe his enculturation exacerbated a latent ability in his mind that was only used sparingly in the wild, but blossomed in a human environment? Or maybe non-human apes have the capacity to pretend that is equal to that of humans, and it was only now that humans were clever enough to uncover it? Any three of these explanations are possible.
I am a big fan of this experiment, despite its shortcomings (which all experiments have), I think it has uncovered solid first evidence of a capacity for pretend in a non-human animal. A form of pretending that is at the very least a building block upon which the kind of intelligence we see in humans can be built. Imagining the world not as it is, but as it could be is at the very heart of what it means to be human. Not just in our social interactions and ability to understand one another, or our ability to reason or uncover causality. It’s at the heart of our storytelling ability, and our capacity for play. It makes me happy to know that apes and other species might have this ability in some form. There is no greater pleasure than imaging (and striving for) a better world, filled with yummy juice.










